In recent years, China’s engagement in Africa has expanded dramatically. Africa-China trade increased tenfold between 1999 and 2006. Chinese political and business leaders regularly visit the continent, while China continues to invest heavily and provide development assistance across Africa. In return, China is securing access to natural resources that Beijing considers essential to its continued development.

Some analysts argue that China-Africa relations have opened a new era for Africa’s development and introduced a different model of cooperation. Yet China’s engagement also raises serious questions about peace and security, among the continent’s most pressing challenges and a major obstacle to African integration.

This chapter examines the impact of the emerging China-Africa partnership on peace and security in Africa, focusing particularly on the conflict in Darfur.

Strong Economic Interests

China is now the world’s second-largest consumer of oil. More than 25 per cent of its oil imports come from the Gulf of Guinea and Sudan. Chinese investment in Africa stands at approximately $1.5 billion a year, and at least 700 Chinese enterprises operate across the continent. China has also written off $1.3 billion in debt owed by African countries, generating considerable goodwill toward Beijing.

China’s new strategic partnership with Africa effectively took off at the Beijing Summit in November 2006, a historic moment in China–Africa relations. Forty-eight African delegations, including 44 heads of state and government, gathered at the Chinese presidential palace to greet President Hu Jintao. Even at African Union summits, it is rare to see so many African leaders assembled for a single meeting. China’s offer was clearly highly attractive.

Rising global demand for energy has encouraged China to turn to Africa as a major oil supplier. At the same time, Africa has become an important market for comparatively inexpensive Chinese manufactured goods.

A Challenge for Peace and Security in Africa

Armed violence is one of the greatest threats to Africa’s development. The continent continues to face territorial disputes, ethnically driven armed conflicts, civil wars, political violence, and the collapse of governments and states.

Over the past 40 years, Africa has experienced at least 30 major conflicts. These have claimed the lives of seven million people and displaced more than 20 million. In a report published in October 2007, the International Action Network on Small Arms (IANSA), Oxfam, and Saferworld estimated the economic cost of armed conflict to Africa’s development. Their findings showed that Algeria, Angola, Burundi, the Central African Republic, Chad, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the Republic of the Congo, Côte d’Ivoire, Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Sudan, and Uganda had collectively lost approximately $300 billion since 1990.

Yet an estimated 95 per cent of the weapons used in these conflicts come from outside the continent, many of them originating in China or bearing the label “Made in China.” Reports further suggest that most of these weapons are initially sold to African governments but may eventually fall into the hands of other armed actors.

China’s adherence to the principle of non-interference in the domestic affairs of other states creates serious challenges for governance, peace, and security in Africa. Supporting authoritarian and undemocratic regimes that terrorise their citizens to remain in power does not serve a continent that has struggled for decades to overcome conflict and repression.

China’s Negative Influence on the Situation in Darfur

China did not cause the conflict in Darfur. However, Chinese oil investments in Sudan have undermined international efforts to resolve the crisis. China has served as Sudan’s principal international patron and has played a central role in the ruling National Congress Party’s foreign relations, particularly regarding international intervention in Darfur. Without Chinese support, the Sudanese government would have found it more difficult to pursue its strategy.

For much of the crisis, China played a largely negative role. It repeatedly obstructed meaningful UN Security Council action and shielded the Sudanese government from international pressure. Numerous reports have also identified China as a major supplier of military equipment to Sudan and linked it to the establishment of arms factories in the country. In response, Darfur rebel groups have targeted Chinese oil interests.

At the same time, China’s enormous economic leverage over the Sudanese government means that it could become a crucial catalyst for change if encouraged to play a more constructive role. China is Sudan’s largest bilateral trading partner and purchases up to 71 per cent of its exports. Although Beijing continues to support the Sudanese government, stronger diplomatic engagement and a more critical posture toward the regime could contribute to peace.

More broadly, China’s relationships with some African governments reinforce authoritarian rule and provide political and economic lifelines to regimes that hold their citizens hostage. This undermines Africa’s efforts to build democratic institutions and accountable states.

Zimbabwe provides another example. President Robert Mugabe has repeatedly stated that he prefers a strong relationship with China because, unlike Western countries, China does not attach political conditions to its investment or development assistance. Yet Mugabe, who has been in power for 28 years, is widely regarded as one of the region’s most repressive leaders.

Pang Zhongying, Professor of International Studies and Director of the Institute of Global Studies at Nankai University, observed that Chinese nationals were increasingly being taken hostage in southern Nigeria and that demonstrators were protesting during visits by Chinese leaders, much as earlier generations had protested against American influence.

From Non-Interference to Non-Indifference

The establishment of the African Union (AU) in 2002 reflected a new recognition that the continent needed a political framework and legal instruments based on the principle of non-indifference. Both the Constitutive Act of the African Union and the Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council provide a basis for collective action when civilians face grave and widespread crimes.

This marked a significant departure from the approach of the AU’s predecessor, the Organization of African Unity. The AU’s founders recognised the Union’s right to intervene in the internal affairs of a member state to protect human rights and constitutional order. Article 4(h) of the Constitutive Act grants the AU the right to intervene, pursuant to a decision of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government, in cases of grave circumstances, namely war crimes, genocide, and crimes against humanity.

To give effect to this shift, the AU established an institutional framework designed to sustain the necessary political will. This led to the development of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA), which recognises the importance of anticipating and preventing conflict while providing mechanisms to respond effectively when conflict occurs. Its principal components include the Peace and Security Council, the Continental Early Warning System, the Panel of the Wise, the African Standby Force, and the AU Policy on Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Development.

In September 2005, world leaders gathered at the UN General Assembly also made a historic commitment to their collective responsibility to protect populations from genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity, and ethnic cleansing. They affirmed a willingness to act when a national government, which bears the primary responsibility for protecting its population, manifestly fails to do so.

These developments, combined with pressure from the international community and civil society, appear to have influenced China’s thinking and conduct in Africa.

Positive Signs from China

Under growing international and civil society pressure, Beijing is learning that separating business from politics is easier said than done. Over the past two years, China’s language and engagement on Darfur have begun to change, suggesting that Beijing wants to be regarded as a constructive actor in efforts to resolve the crisis.

After years of obstructing UN Security Council action, China supported Resolution 1769, which authorised the deployment of the African Union–United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID). Beijing also invested considerable diplomatic effort in persuading Sudan to accept the mission.

The appointment of Liu Guijin as China’s first special envoy for African affairs in the summer of 2007 provided another indication that Beijing wanted to demonstrate greater engagement. Although the envoy has maintained a low profile and has preferred quiet, behind-the-scenes diplomacy, his appointment created a potential channel through which pressure could be placed on Khartoum. It also allowed China to pursue its interests through more active diplomacy and participation in multilateral discussions on Darfur.

At the January 2008 AU Summit, the Chinese delegation issued an unprecedented public warning to the Sudanese government that the world was “running out of patience” over Darfur. Earlier, in February 2007, China’s ambassador to Sudan, Wang Guangya, reportedly said that President Hu Jintao had delivered a clear message to Sudan: Kofi Annan’s proposal was sound and Khartoum should accept it.

China has also increased humanitarian assistance to Sudan, including support for the construction of 120 schools and hospitals. At approximately $10 million, however, this assistance remains modest compared with China’s economic interests in the country. Chinese companies are also constructing an 85-kilometre water project in South Darfur, while 315 Chinese engineers were deployed to Darfur in October 2007 to support UNAMID.

The Way Forward

Despite this progress, China could do considerably more. As one of Africa’s most important economic and diplomatic partners, China should be encouraged to:

• Promote peace and stability in Africa as essential foundations for sustainable economic cooperation.
• Play a more constructive role in the UN Security Council.
• Sustain diplomatic pressure on the Sudanese government and Darfur’s rebel groups to cease hostilities and reach a political settlement.
• End arms sales to the Sudanese government. China has exported military helicopters to Sudan and other countries, and documented cases indicate that helicopters have been used to kill civilians in Sudan’s conflicts.
• Press for the full and unhindered deployment and effective operation of UNAMID.
• Contribute additional funding, military and police assets, and personnel to UNAMID. Greater Chinese involvement could significantly strengthen the mission’s ability to protect civilians.
• Urge the Sudanese government to stop supporting actors who destabilise Sudan and Chad or exacerbate the regional crisis.
• Increase its financial contribution to the African Union’s Peace and Security Architecture.

Bibliography

• Downs, Erica S. “The Fact and Fiction of Sino-African Energy Relations.” China Security, vol. 3, no. 3, Summer 2007.
• Taylor, Darren. “Analysts Explain the Significance of the Evolving Relationship Between China and Africa.” Voice of America, 3 May 2007.
• Said Djinnit, AU Commissioner for Peace and Security. Speech on the responsibility to protect, Addis Ababa, 8 June 2007.
• Mugumya, Geoffrey, AU Director for Peace and Security. Speech on the responsibility to protect, Addis Ababa, 8 June 2007.

About the Author

Désiré Assogbavi, a Pan African Senior Policy Analyst was, at the time of writing, the Director of Oxfam International Liaison Office to the African Union.

The opinions expressed in this article are entirely those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of his organisation.